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COURT OF APPEALS, 1959 TERM
fendant did then and there perpetrate an act of sexual intercourse with said
child."
Since the defendant was under 21 and the complainant under 18 years
of age, and the only act or conduct likely to impair the morals of this infant,
which was either alleged or proven, was the single act of intercourse, the crime
charged necessarily amounted to a misdemeanor rape.65 The Court of Appeals
reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial on the ground that the jury
was erroneously instructed that corroboration was not necessary to support a
conviction of impairment of the morals of a minor. The majority held that
a prosecutor may not circumvent the requirement of corroboration necessary
for conviction of misdemeanor rape simply by charging instead the impairment
of the morals of a minor.
The dissent argued that the crime of rape and endangering the health
and morals of a minor are separate offenses and there being no statute requiring corroborative evidence to support a conviction for the latter offense
the Court should not read in such a requirement.
In order to support a conviction for impairment of the morals of a minor
there need be no criminal nor malicious intent66 and the consent of the child
is immaterial. 67 A co-defendant of Lo Verde, who acted as -lookout and drove
the car in which the intercourse -took place, was convicted of impairment of
the morals of a minor. He did not appeal the conviction.
This case would seem to indicate that any conviction, based on uncorroborated evidence, must fail where only rape or defilement is proven, but will be
sustained, regardless of corroboration, if the crime proven can stand independent of the proof necessary for a conviction of rape or defilement. This
somewhat anomolous result is justified on the ground that it is doubtful the
Legislature intended the statute to serve as a "catch-all" violation to prevent
the acquittal of a defendant where the necessary corroboration is lacking.
MAXIMUM SPEED LIrIT IN ABSENcE oF MARKINGS
Defendant, convicted of speeding over fifty m.p.h. under then New York
Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 56(3)68 by a Justice of the Peace, obtained a
reversal in County Court, Orange County. On appeal the Court of Appeals
in People v. Shapiro,69 reversed the County Colrt and upheld the validity of
the Section under which the conviction wfs obtained. The pertinent part of
Section 56(3) provides:
65. N.Y. Penal Law § 2010:

A person who perpetrates an act of sexual intercourse with a female, not his wife,
under the age of 18 years, under circumstances not amounting to rape in the first
degree or rape in the second degree is guilty of a misdemeanor.
66. People v. Caminiti, - Misc. -, 28 N.YS.2d 133 (City Ct. 1941).
67. People v. Gibson, 232 N.Y. 458, 134 N.E. 531 (1922).
68. Now N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law §§ 1180(2), 1620.
69. 7 N.Y.2d 370, 197 N.Y.S.2d 715 (1960).
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"Absence of signs erected pursuant to the provisions of section ninetyfive-c of this article on any state highway outside of cities or incorporated villages shall be presumptive evidence that the state traffic
commission has not fixed a maximum speed greater than fifty miles
per hour at that location."
The alleged speeding took place June 11, 1959. Section 95-c of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law was repealed (eff. July 1, 1958) and Section 1620
enacted to replace it. Both Sections permitted the State Traffic Commission
to set a higher or lower limit than fifty m.p.h. But while the repealed Section 95-c had a provision for posting,70 Section 1620 did not. Defendant argued
that this omission destroyed the presumption of Section 56(3), namely, that
in the absence of signs to the contrary the speed limit is. fifty m.p.h.
The Court of Appeals in upholding this conviction was in all probability
influenced by the results of a converse holding, to wit, that on any unmarked
road a person could go any speed and then rely on the argument of this
defendant-that there is no presumption of a fifty m.p.h. limit. 71 Thus the
state would have been forced in every prosecution for speeding over fifty
m.p.h. to prove the existence of adequate markings as one of the elements
of the offense.
This situation will be covered by Vehicle and Traffic Law Section 1620
(eff. Oct. 1, 1961), without the need for cross-reference and in effect doing
away with the basis of this defendant's argument. The section provides:
"Absence of signs installed pursuant to this section shall be presumptive evidence that the state traffic commission has not established
a higher maximum speed limit than the fifty miles per hour statutory
limit."
Thus the law was, is and will remain that the speed limit, in absence of other
factors expressly enumerated as calling for a lower limit, e.g. a hazard, is
fifty m.p.h., unless a higher limit be posted. The fifty mile limit is effective
notwithstanding lack of marking to that effect.
TURN SIGNAL REQUIREMENT QUALIFIED

Defendant, a motorist, failed to signal before turning at a multi-signal
intersection. His action was alleged to be a violation of Section 1163 of the
Vehicle and Traffic Law which requires a signal if other traffic will be affected
by such turn.72 A divided Court of Appeals affirmed a finding of guilt by the
lower courts.
70. Speed zones established pursuant to the foregoing provisions of this section
shall be adequately marked and suitable warning signs erected.
71. People v. Van Wieren, 180 N.Y.S.2d 560 (Ct. Spec. Sess. 1958). Similar fact
situation to case noted, same Court reversing a conviction under § 56(3).
72. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163(a):
No person shall turn a vehicle at an intersection . . . or turn a vehicle to enter
a private road or driveway, or otherwise turn a vehicle from a direct course or
move right or left upon a roadway unless and until such movement can be made
with reasonable safety. No person shall so turn any vehicle without giving an

